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REASONABLE DOUBT. HOW IN THE WORLD IS IT DEFNED?
Thomas V MuIrine
INTRODUCTION
The "not guilty" verdict delivered by the jury in the celebrated OJ. Simpson
murder trial' stunned a large segment of the American population2 and baffled ob-
* J.D., January, 1997, Washington College of Law, American University. This arti-
cle is dedicated to the memory of my son Matthew. I will never forget his spirit, his sweet-
ness, his genuine love of others, his gentleness, and his smile. He will always be my pride,
my joy, and my hero.
1. See People v. Simpson, No. BA 097211, 1995 WL 704381, at 2-4 (Cal. Super. Trans.,
Oct. 3, 1995) (Official Transcript Verdict) (finding Orenthal James Simpson not guilty of the
murders of Nichole Brown Simpson and Ronald Lyle Goldman). Many in the media dubbed
this the "Trial of the Century." Eg. Virginia Culver, History in the Maka'ng; Landmark Trials
Punctuate Past, DENvER PoST, June 9, 1996, at B1; Rivera Live: Panel Discussion on How
Race Relations have been Affected by the O.J. Simpson Trial (CNBC television broadcast, June
13, 1996), available in WESTLAW, 1996 WL 7051687; Denny Heck, Vieupoint: Citizens
Will be Better Served by Seeing Justices on Camera, NEvs TRIBUNE (TACOMA, WASH.), June
10, 1996, at A9. In this case, prosecutors accused OJ. Simpson, a prominent black football
hero and immensely popular television sportscaster, of the murders of his former wife and her
friend. Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., The Definding of the Post Conviction Defense Organizations
as a Denial of the Right to Counsel, 98 W. VA. L. REv. 863. Mr. Simpson possessed the eco-
nomic means to assemble a team of nationally prominent defense attorneys. Id The defense
team, throughout the lengthy and nationally televised trial, presented a number of theories de-
signed to counter the evidence gathered by the prosecution and raise a reasonable doubt to the
possibility of Simpson's guilt. Susan B. Jordan, Raising a Reasonable Doubt, 1995 NYL
462124 (OJ.Comnm.). The defense claimed:
a police conspiracy, that blood was planted to establish the guilt of Simp-
son, that the police investigation was sloppy, that the coroner's work was
riddled with errors of protocol, that the time frame could only be estab-
lished by a dog barling, and that the DNA evidence was unbelievably
technical and therefore capable of rejection by ajury of lay people.
Id Another important factor in the outcome of the trial was the assertion by the defense that
one of the key prosecution witnesses, Mark Fuhrman, the Los Angeles detective who found
much of the physical evidence used by the prosecution, was a racist. Simpson Jury Fore-
woman Thought Fuhrman a "Snake", WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 1996, at A3. After the trial, sev-
eral jurors wrote that they did not believe any of his testimony. Id The standard California
jury instructions on reasonable doubt state:
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servers worldwide.3 Many people wondered how a jury presented with such mas-
sive amounts of evidence could conclude a "reasonable doubt" existed concerning
the guilt of O.3. Simpson. Some prominent citizens even opined that one could
buy a reasonable doubt.
5
The O.J. Simpson case is only one in a recent series of highly publicized crimi-
nal cases that illustrates the complexities surrounding the jury system6 and the dif-
A defendant in a criminal action is presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved, and in the case of a reasonable doubt whether (his)(her) guilt is
satisfactorily shown, (he)(she) is entitled to a verdict of not guilty. This
presumption places upon the People the burden of proving (him)(her)
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Reasonable doubt is defined as fol-
lows: It is not mere possible doubt; because everything relating to human
affairs, and depending on moral evidence, is open to some possible or
imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case which, after the entire com-
parison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of the ju-
rors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction,
to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge,
Jordan, supra at 2 (citing California Criminal Jury Instructions, CALJIC 2.90).
2. See Steve Marshall, The Simpson Verdict, CMc. SUN-Tmms, Oct. 4, 1995, at 11
(reporting that in a poll of 639 people nationwide conducted by USA Today/CNN/Gallup on
the day the verdict was delivered, October 3, 1995, 56% did not agree with the verdict, 33%
did agree, and 11% had no opinion); Kevin Johnson, After the Verdict, USA TODAY, Oct. 4,
1995, at 5A (reporting that online traffic was extremely heavy immediately following the an-
nouncement of the verdict and that a Prodigy survey showed 85% did not agree with the jury's
finding of not guilty, and 62% of those sending electronic messages to USA Today Online also
disagreed).
3. See Tom Barrett, The Verdict on Juries; O.J Simpson's Rapid Acquittal Rings Alarm
About Whether Justice is Served by the Jury System, EDMONTON J., Oct. 22, 1995, at DI
(noting that many around the world were shocked by the jury verdict and observing, in coun-
tries where the jury system exists, a revival of the question of whether jury trials adequately
enable discovery of the truth).
4. See Erin Donnelly, On-campus: What Do You Think of the O.J Verdict?, SUN-
SENTINEL (FT. LAUDERDALE), Nov. 15, 1995, at 19 (reporting interviews with students reflect-
ing a variety of viewpoints including those who felt there was no reasonable doubt).
5. See Hugh Davies, Simpson Acquittal, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Oct. 25, 1995, at 14 (quoting
former New York Governor Mario Cuomo, "Money can buy you reasonable doubt. I say that
with no bitterness. It's just a fact."); 141 CoNG. REc. H9776-01 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1995)
(statement of Rep. Owens) (stating there was reasonable doubt in the O.J. Simpson case be-
cause the defense lawyers, the "architects and engineers of reasonable doubt" and the "best-
paid lawyers in America," had "great skills and unlimited funds" and put reasonable doubt in
the minds of the jurors).
6. See Laura Mansnerus, Deliberating on the US. Jury System; Ire over Recent Verdicts
Highlights Demand for Change, NEws AND OBSERvER (RALEIGH, NC), Nov. 6, 1995, at A4
(quoting Professor Jeffrey Abramson of Brandeis University that the "big-time cases," includ-
ing the trials of John Hinckley, Oliver North, Lorena Bobbitt, the Menendez Brothers, Lemrick
Nelson, the Los Angeles police officers accused of beating Rodney King, and particularly O.J.
Simpson have "not been pretty"). Abramson expresses the belief that cases such as these feed
the public's fear that juries are not reflecting the community conscience, but arc merely
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ficulties juries sometimes encounter in understanding the "reasonable doubt" con-
cept A certain skepticism regarding both the jury system and the concept of rea-
sonable doubt, however, is not just emerging. The great American satirist Mark
Twain wrote the following observation about the jury system in 1872:
When the peremptory challenges were all exhausted, a jury of
twelve men was impaneled-a jury who swore that they had
neither heard, read, talked about nor expressed an opinion con-
cerning a murder which the very cattle in the corrals ... were
cognizant of. ... It actually came out afterward that one of [the
jurors] thought that incest and arson were the same thing!
In a similarly skeptical, although less light-hearted, vein, it has been said that
"[wihat a reasonable doubt really amounts to, judges have found difficulty in ex-
plaining."8
The concept of reasonable doubt continues to receive a considerable amount of
judicial attention.9 A Canadian court recently observed that "throughout the com-
mon law jurisdictions of the world there is widespread disagreement as to the
proper definition of both reasonable doubt and the reasonable doubt standard of
proof." 1 Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority in Victor v. Nebraska," noted
"chosen for their susceptibility to lawyers' racial or political appeals." lt
7. MARKTWAwN, RoUrm GIT 341-43 (American, 1872), quoted in Albert W. Alschuler,
The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire Peremptory Challenges, and The Rview of Jury
Verdicts, 56 U. Cur L. REv. 153, 233 n.4 (1989). Alschuler further quotes a saying attribut-
able to Mark Twain that, "[w]e have ajury system [in the United States] that is superior to any
in the world, and its efficiency is only marred by the difficulty of finding twelve men everyday
who don't know anything and can't read.' Id at 154.
8. PHPsONONEvIDCE, § 119, at 121 (John H. Buzzard et al. eds., lIth ed. 1970). The
treatise further notes that while some British jurists have criticized the phrase itself, one jurist,
Judge Denning, expressed it in these terms:
Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond a shadow of
doubt. The law would fail to protect the community if it admitted fanciful
possibilities to deflect the course ofjustice. If the evidence is so strong...
as to leave only a remote possibility in [the accused's] favor, which can be
dismissed with the sentence "of course it's possible but not in the least
probable," the case is proved beyond reasonable doubt, but nothing short
of that will suffice.
Id
9. See Barbara J. Shapiro, "To a Aforal Certainty": Theories of Knowledge and Anglo-
American Juries 1600-1850, 38 HAsT GS LJ. 153, 154 (1986) [hereinafter Shapiro, To a
Moral Certainty] (noting, as a typical example of such attention, a suggestion by California
Supreme Court Justice Stanley Mosk to remove all attempts to explain "reasonable doubt"
from the California reasonable doubt instruction and leave only the phrase itself in the instruc-
tions). This suggestion was incorporated into a bill and presented to the California legislature
in 1986. I Apparently the bill did not pass; in 1995 the instructions read to jurors in the OJ.
Simpson trial referred to "moral certainty," a phrase that had caused Justice Mosk particular
concern. Jordan, supra note 1, at 2.
10. Regina v. Brydon [1995], 95 C.C.C. (3d) 509, 517 (Vood, JA., dissenting).
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that although the standard of reasonable doubt "is an ancient and honored aspect of
our criminal justice system, it defies easy explication."1 2 In spite of the interna-
tional judicial attention,1 3 however, the "reasonable doubt" concept appears no less
elusive today than it was in 1880 when Justice Woods, delivering the opinion of
the Court in Miles v. United States,1 4 observed that "[a)ttempts to explain the term
'reasonable doubt' do not usually result in making it any clearer to the minds of
the jury."' 5
Several views exist regarding the complicated concept of reasonable doubt.
Some legal scholars and analysts strongly advocate not defining the term at all.1
6
Others argue that suggesting the meaning of "reasonable doubt" as self-evident is
"patently absurd,"' 17 and believe that a jury comprised of ordinary citizens with no
legal training cannot possibly understand the term's meaning without further
definition. 18 Still other scholars opine that additional explanation of the term cre-
ates increasing ambiguity.' 9
This Comment will examine the concept of reasonable doubt. Part I examines
the origins of the reasonable doubt concept and traces its development to the pres-
ent. Part II addresses recurrent problems in applying the concept and examines
various attempts to define it. In light of the increasingly strident controversy in the
United States regarding the reasonable doubt standard, Part Ill explores other
countries' approaches to the determination of guilt. Finally, Part IV recommends
11. 114 S. Ct. 1239 (1994).
12. Id at 1242.
13. See Brydon, 95 C.C.C. (3d), at 516 (noting widespread disagreement as to the defini-
tion and standard of "reasonable doubt" in common law jurisdictions throughout the world).
14. 103 U.S. 304 (1880).
15. Id at312.
16. See, e.g., Note, Reasonable Doubt: An Argument Against Definition, 108 HARV. L.
Rnv. 1955 (1995) [hereinafter Reasonable Doubt] (exploring the advantages and disadvan-
tages of providing a detailed explanation of the term "reasonable doubt" to jurors and conclud-
ing that the term is better left undefined); Walter W. Steele, Jr. & Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Jury
Instructions: A Persistent Failure to Communicate, 67 N.C. L. REy. 77, 100 (suggesting that
an attempt to define reasonable doubt may "rob the law of its flexibility, its ability to evolve
with changing times and changing community standards"); United States v. Taylor, 997 F.2d
1551, 1558 (1993) (providing that "[tihe purposes of having juries may best be served ifjuries,
in the first instance, bear the responsibility for defining reasonable doubt").
17. See H. Richard Uviller, Acquitting the Guilty Two Case Studies on Jury Misgivings
and the Misunderstood Standard of Proof 2 CRIM. L.F. 1 (1990) (examining two cases of
what appear to be false acquittals and concluding that the reasonable doubt standard is am-
biguous and may partly account for the apparently erroneous acquittals); Reasonable Doubt,
supra note 16, at 1959 (acknowledging that even judges often incorrectly describe the reason-
able doubt standard).
18. See Henry A. Diamond, Note, Reasonable Doubt: To Define, or Not to Define, 90
COLUM. L. REv. 1716 (1990) (arguing that jurors should always be provided with an explana-
tion of the term "reasonable doubt" in criminal trials).
19. See Jon 0. Newman, Madison Lecture: Beyond Reasonable Doubt, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv.
979, 984 (1993) (finding "it rather unsettling that we are using a formulation that we believe
will become less clear the more we explain it.").
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approaches to reduce the existing confusion surrounding the concept of
"reasonable doubt" and restore some of the luster to our tarnished trial by jury
system.
I. BACKGROUND AND HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
In 1970 the Supreme Court explicitly held for the first time that, according to
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution, the state must prove every element of a charged criminal offense beyond a
reasonable doubt to convict an accused criminal.20 This holding, however, did not
introduce a revolutionary concept to the criminal justice system - the reasonable
doubt standard has held a central role in the Anglo-American criminal justice sys-
tem since the late eighteenth century.2 '
The reasonable doubt standard evolved from the jury trial system spawned in
England during the twelfth century!2 Although details of early British jury trials
are largely unknown,23 jurors in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries most likely
both gathered and weighed evidence, and witnesses were probably not a regular
part of the criminal trial process. 2! The "self-informed jurors" were men from the
local area who were assumed to know the facts of the case and were expected to
reach a verdict through their own personal knowledge.5 The jurors arrived at their
verdicts based on their own intuition, common sense, and common knowledge of
the facts surrounding the circumstances.
26
By the sixteenth century, however, witnesses became a vital part of criminal
trials and members of the jury were no longer self-informed.2 7 Jurors were now
responsible for weighing and evaluating facts about which they had no personal
knowledge;28 they needed standards to evaluate the credibility of testimony.29 A
standard of proof short of absolute certainty, but more exact than mere opinion,
evolved from religious and scientific arguments concerning proof.30 The phrase
20. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding that "[l]est there remain any doubt
about the constitutional stature of the reasonable doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the
Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged").
21. See BARBARA J. SHAPIRo, BEYOND "REASONABLE DOUBT" AND "PROBABLE CAUSE" 1
(1991) (tracing the development of the reasonable doubt standard).
22. Id at 3.
23. Id
24. Id at4.
25. Id
26. SHAPIRO, supra note, at 4.
27. Id at 5.
28. Id at 6.
29. Id
30. See id at 7 (discussing, at length, an overlapping group of theologians' and natural-
ists' efforts to develop a level of knowledge less than absolute certainty, but more certain than
opinion). Theologians and naturalists subscribed to three subcategories of "kmowledge" (as
1997]
AM U J INT'L L. & POL'Y
"beyond a reasonable doubt" captures this standard.3 '
The precise origin and development of the standard represented by the words
"beyond a reasonable doubt" for criminal trials are uncertain.32 Two primary ac-
counts exist regarding when the reasonable doubt standard first appeared in Eng-
lish and American case law. 3 One theory, outlined by Judge John Wilder May in
an influential article written in 1876, 34 claims that the reasonable doubt standard
originated in the Irish Treason Trials in 1798.55 The other theory holds that both
English and American courts used the phrase earlier in the eighteenth centur;
proponents of this theory cite its use during the Boston Massacre Trials in 1770.
36
opposed to "probability"): (I) physical knowledge, derived from sensory data such as seeing,
hearing, or touching; (2) mathematical knowledge, established by "logical demonstrations"
such as geometric proofs; and (3) moral knowledge, based on testimonial evidence and the re-
ports of others about physical data. Id at 7-8. It was the last, moral certainty, that was most
related to the law. Id at 8. Shapiro explains that while these moral certainties were not abso-
lute, they could be so clear that anyone "whose judgment is free from prejudice will consent to
them." Id at 8 (quoting JOHN WLKINs, OF THE PRINCIPLES AND DuniEs OF NATURAL RELIGION,
7-8 (London 1675)). This concept of moral certainty has survived to vex Justice O'Connor,
who wrote in 1994 that "[i]ndeed we have said that 'proof to a moral certainty is an equivalent
phrase with beyond a reasonable doubt'." Victor v. Nebraska, 114 S. Ct. 1239. 1246 (1994)
(quoting Fidelity Mut. Life Ass'n v. Mettler, 185 U.S. 308, 317 (1902)). Justice O'Connor
further stated that the Court was "somewhat more concerned with [the] argument that the
phrase 'moral certainty' has lost its historical meaning, and that a modem jury would under-
stand it to allow conviction on proof that does not meet the beyond a reasonable doubt stan-
dard." Id at 1247. The Court then concluded that, given the facts of Victor, the term "moral
certainty" was not ambiguous because other jury instructions were given that put the phrase
into its proper perspective. Id.
3 1. Newman, supra note 19, at 98 1.
32. See Uviller, supra note 17, at 38 (noting that there is little information about the origin
and development of the reasonable doubt standard because no one took verbatim transcripts, or
even notes, at trials in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and the writers of the period
very rarely mentioned common practices ofjudges).
33. See Shelagh Kenney, Note, Fifth Amendment-Upholding The Constitutional Merit of
Misleading Reasonable Doubt Jury Instructions, 85 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 989, 990
(1995) (tracing the history of the reasonable doubt standard).
34. John Wilder May, Some Rules of Evidence: Reasonable Doubt in Civil and Criminal
Cases, 10 AM. L. REv. 642 (1876) cited in Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 10 n.8, Sandoval
v. California, 114 S.Ct. 1239 (1993) (No. 92-9049). The Petitioner notes that May's authori-
tative and widely read article criticized the addition of moral certainty language into the rea-
sonable doubt instruction. Wigmore later cited May's article with approval. Id. (citing
WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2497, at 410 (9th ed.)).
35. May, supra note 34, at 656. See Kenney, supra note 33, at 990 (noting May's con-
tention that during the trial of Rex v. Finney, 26 How. St. Tr. 1019 (Ire. 1798), the defense
counsel argued that as a rule of law the jury must acquit the defendant if its members "entertain
a reasonable doubt upon the truth of the testimony of witnesses given upon the issue").
36. Anthony A. Morano, A Reexamination of the Development of the Reasonable Doubt
Rule, 55 B.U. L. REV. 507, 508 (1975) (relating that in the Boston Massacre Trials of 1770,
Robert Treat Paine, British Crown counsel, used the term "beyond a reasonable doubt"). Paine
argued for the conviction of the British soldiers for firing into an unruly crowd of Bostonians
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Both Professor Anthony A. Morano and Professor Barbara J. Shapiro's writings
extensively document this second theory." Professor Shapiro also notes that the
reasonable doubt standard appears in a number of American trials around the early
1800's.38 Regardless of its origin and development, by the mid-nineteenth century
the reasonable doubt standard became "widely accepted as the accurate description
of the degree of doubt necessary for acquittal of a criminal defendant."3
The reasonable doubt standard remained an important consideration not only in
the case law of this period, but discussions of the topic also frequently appeared in
the treatises of the day.4 These legal scholars sought to demonstrate that the stan-
dards of proof in the law were compatible with those in other forms of inquiry
such as religion and philosophy.
4 1
protesting the presence of the Crown's soldiers. He asserted,
If therefor in the examination of this Cause the Evidence is not sufficient
to Convince you beyond reasonable doubt of the Guilt of any or all of the
Prisoners by the Benignity and Reason of the Law you will acquit them,
but if the Evidence be sufficient to convince you of their Guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt the Justice of the Law will require you to declare them
Guilty and the Benignity of the Law will be satisfied in the fairness and
impartiality of their Tryal.
3 KINNIN WROTH & HIULER B. ZOBEL, LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 271 (1965) as quoted in
Kenig, supra note 16. See Shapiro, To a Moral Certainty, supra note 9, at 171 (noting with
approval Morano's conclusion that the beyond reasonable doubt standard was used in the
Boston Massacre Cases in 1770, but that it did not appear innovative because both bench and
prosecution stressed the trial was being conducted in the traditional English manner).
37. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (criticizing moral certainty language added
into reasonable doubt instruction).
38. See Shapiro, To a Moral Certainty, supra note 9, at 174 (citing Lyon's Case, 15 F.
Cas. 1183, 1185 (D.Vt. 1798) (Case No. 8646), in which the judge informed thejury, "[y]ou
must be satisfied beyond all reasonable substantial doubt that the hypothesis of innocence is
unsustainable," and the Case of Fries, 9 F. Cas. 826, 883 (D.Pa. 1799) (Case No. 5126), in
which the defense counsel advised the jury to "remember it is enough for us in defence of the
prisoner, to raise a doubt; for, if you doubt (it is the principal of law, as well as humanity) you
must acquit").
39. Kenney, supra note 33, at 991.
40. See id at 991-92 (citing WIGMORE ON EvIDENCE § 2856, at 502-03 (2d ed. 1935)).
Dean Wigmore states that "vhen the risk ofjury-doubt is exclusively on the prosecution, their
belief must amount to a sense of being morally certain beyond any reasonable doubt, i.e. in
favor of the prosecutor's contention." WIGNIOEON EvIDENCE § 2856, at 502-03 (2d ed. 1935)
as quoted in Kenney, supra note 33 at 991. Simon Greenleaf refers to satisfactory evidence as
"that amount of proof... which ordinarily satisfies an unprejudiced mind ... beyond a rea-
sonable doubt" SImoN GREENLEAF, LAW OF EvDENcE § 1, at 4 (13th ed. 1876). See also
Shapiro, To a Moral Certainty, supra note 9, at 189 (observing that Greenleafs discussion of
reasonable doubt explicitly links "satisfied mind" and "satisfied conscience," the formulas
most common in seventeenth and early eighteenth century charges to the jury, with the concept
of "beyond reasonable doubt").
41. See SHAPIRO, supra note 21, at 40 (noting that after the jury trial concept evolved to a
point at which the jury was expected to critically evaluate the evidence, legal thinkers turned to
the writings of such philosophers as Wilkens, Tillotson, Boyle, Locke, Steat, Whately and
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In her book, Beyond "Reasonable Doubt" and "Probable Cause, ,42 Barbara
Shapiro concludes that throughout the development of the concept of reasonable
doubt, writers have recognized the importance of the jury's understanding of two
central concepts. 43 First, the jury must understand there are two separate catego-
ries of human knowledge. 44 There is the mathematical category in which it is
possible to achieve certainty to the highest level. 45 For example, it is absolutely
certain that two plus two equals four. Additionally there is the empirical category
in which absolute certainty is not attainable.46
The second concept the jury must understand is that while it is not possible to
attain absolute certainty in the empirical category, it is possible to achieve in-
creased certainty through the introduction of better evidence. 47  The mid-
nineteenth century treatise writers called this highest level of certainty in the em-
pirical category "moral certainty 48 and equated it with the concept of "beyond a
reasonable doubt., 49 Reflecting this trend, the courts also adopted the linkage
between "moral certainty" and "beyond a reasonable doubt." 50
An early attempt to clarify reasonable doubt for a jury, after the concept be-
came established in America, reflected the association between "moral certainty"
and "reasonable doubt."'" In 1850 Chief Justice Shaw of the Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court attempted to articulate this association. 52 Delivering what
has come to be known as the "Webster charge," Chief Justice Shaw instructed the
jury in part that
[reasonable doubt] is not mere possible doubt; because every-
thing relating to human affairs, and depending on moral evi-
dence, is open to some possible or imaginary doubt ... [I]t is not
sufficient to establish a probability, though a strong one ...; but
Mill and incorporated their religious and philosophical teachings into the concept of reasonable
doubt).
42. Id. at 40-41.
43. Id. (tracing the development of the beyond reasonable doubt standard).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id
47. SHAPiao, supra note 21, at 40-41.
48. Id.
49. See id at 40 (noting legal scholars attempted to show that the standards of evidence
and proof in the field of law were like those in other fields such as science and religion and that
the "beyond reasonable doubt" standard was the result).
50. Fidelity Mut. Life Ass'n v. Mettler, 185 U.S. 308, 317 (1902) (stating "proof to a
moral certainty is an equivalent phrase with "beyond a reasonable doubt.") as quoted in Victor
v. Nebraska, 114 S. Ct. 1239, 1246 (1994).
51. See Victor at 1244 (citing Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 412 n.6 (1972) (noting
that "the Webster charge is representative of the time when 'American courts began applying
[the beyond reasonable doubt standard] in its modem form in criminal cases"'). See also infra
notes 52-56 and accompanying text (discussing Webster charge).
52. Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. 295 (Mass. 1850). See Victor, 114 S. Ct., at
1244 (approving the Webster charge as the most accurate definition of reasonable doubt).
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the evidence must establish the truth of the fact to a reasonable
and moral certainty ... This we take to be proof beyond reason-
able doubt 53
In Victor v. Nebraska54 the Supreme Court noted with approval the California
Supreme Court's characterization of the Webster charge as "probably the most
satisfactory definition ever given to the words 'reasonable doubt' in any case
known to criminal jurisprudence. " 55 The Supreme Court's assessment of the
Webster charge itself, however, failed to include or account for its identified in-
adequacies.5
6
In his article analyzing the Supreme Court decision in Victor v. Nebraska,7
Shelagh Kenney points out that several distinguished commentators of the time
53. See Victor, 114 S. Ct., at 1244 (1994) (quoting Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass.
295, 320 (1850) and discussing the Court's use of the Webster charge in Sandoval v. Califor-
nia, 4 Cal 4th 155 (1992)). The full instruction given in Webster by the Massachusetts court is
as follows:
What is reasonable doubt? It is a term often used, probably pretty well
understood, but not easily defined. It is not mere possible doubt; b-cause
everything relating to human affairs, and depending on moral evidence, is
open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case,
which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence,
leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition that they cannot say they
feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge.
The burden of proof is upon the prosecutor. All the presumptions of the
law independent of evidence are in favor of innocence; and every person
is presumed to be innocent until he is proven guilty. If upon such proof
there is reasonable doubt remaining, the accused is entitled to the benefit
of it by an acquittal. For it is not sufficient to establish a probability,
though a strong one arising from the doctrine of chances, that the fact
charged is more likely to be true than the contrary; but the evidence must
establish the truth of the fact to a reasonable and moral certainty; a cer-
tainty that convinces and directs the understanding, and satisfies the rea-
son and judgment, of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it.
This we take to be proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Webster, 59 Mass., at 320 as quoted in Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1244.
54. Victor, 114 S. Ct., at 1244.
55. People v. Strong, 30 Cal. 151, 155 (1866) (quoted in Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1244). The
Court also notes that the California Supreme Court further endorsed the Webster charge in
People v. Paulsell, 115 Cal. 151, 155 (1896). 114 S. Ct., at 1244. The California Legislature
incorporated much of the Webster charge as the statutory definition of reasonable doubt in
1927. Id In 1979 the California Supreme Court urged a reconsideration of this definition, but
in 1986 a legislative committee formed to study alternatives recommended that the legislature
retain the statute unmodified. Id at 1245. At the time of Victor, in 1994, it had not ben
modified. Id
56. See Kenney, supra note 33, at 1014-15 (noting that the Supreme Court incorrectly
decided Victor and Sandoval, partially because they relied on the approval of the Webster
charge by nineteenth-century and early twentieth century courts).
57. 114 S. Ct. 1239 (1994).
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took exception to the Webster charge.58 Kenney also notes that the Supreme
59 . . .60Court, in the 1887 case Hopt v. Utah,59 criticizes the Webster definition, stating
that "[t]he difficulty with [the Webster] instruction is that the words 'to a reason-
able and moral certainty' add nothing to the words 'beyond a reasonable doubt;'
one may require explanation as much as the other."61 Thus, Kenney concludes that
the Supreme Court of the 1880's found the use of the term "moral certainty" pre-
sented a problem.62
Kenney also asserts that the Court in Victor does not address the underlying is-
sue: the language in the Victor jury instructions, much of which comes from the
63Webster charge, does not adequately convey the concept of reasonable doubt to
the modem juror.64 The Court held that the Victor charge, "taken as a whole prop-
58. See Kenney, supra note 33, at 1014 (citing May, supra note 34, at 663) (noting that
Judge May, a contemporary of Chief Justice Shaw, not only characterized the definition as
"unsuccessful" and "unfortunate," but also asserted that "the rules of law should be stated with
unmistakable precision"). Judge May also criticized the use of the term "moral certainty,"
asking, "[of w]hat possible end can such a heaping up of undefinable terms serve, but to con-
fuse and baffle rather than enlighten and aid the average juror?" May, supra note 34, at 663 as
quoted in Kenney, supra note 33, at 1014-15. See also 9 WIGMORE § 2497, at 405-09
(Chadboum rev. 1981) as quoted in Kenney, supra note 33, at 1015 n.217. Dean Wigmore
states that "when anything more than a simple caution and brief definition is given, the matter
tends to become one of mere words, and the actual effect upon the jury, instead of being en-
lightenment, is likely to be confusion, or at the least, a continued incomprehension." Id.; Pro-
fessor William Trickett, Preponderance of Evidence, and Reasonable Doubt, 10 FORUM 75, 85
(1906) as cited in Kenney, supra note 33, at 1015. Prof. Trickett adds that "it is impossible to
see how the ordinary juror is to be aided by being told that if he is morally certain of the pris-
oner's guilt, to convict him." Id
59. 120 U.S. 430 (1887) cited in Kenney, supra note 33, at 1015 n.225.
60. Kenney, supra note 33, at 1015.
61. Id (quoting Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430, 440 (1887) (quoting Commonwealth v.
Webster, 59 Mass. 295, 320 (1850)).
62. Id. at 1016.
63. See Victor, 114 S. Ct., at 1249 (noting the Victor jury instruction is a blending of the
Webster charge and Nebraska case law). The Victor instruction is extrapolated from the
Webster charge and a series of Nebraska state court decisions which "approv[e] instructions
cast in terms of an 'actual doubt' that would cause a reasonable person to hesitate to act." Id.
64. See id. (spawning the Victor trial jury instructions). The trial judge in Victor in-
structed the jury that:
The burden is always on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all
of the material elements of the crime charged, and this burden never shifts.
"Reasonable doubt" is such doubt as would cause a reasonable and pru-
dent person, in one of the graver and more important transaction in life, to
pause and hesitate before taking the represented facts as true and relying
and acting thereon. It is such doubt as will not permit you, after full, fair,
and impartial consideration of all the evidence, to have an abiding convic-
tion, to a moral certainty, of the guilt of the accused. At the same time,
absolute or mathematical certainty is not required. You may be convinced
of the truth of a fact beyond a reasonable doubt and yet be fully aware that
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erly communicated the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury."' '  In addition to
language concerning moral certainty, the Victor charge also advises the jurors that
a reasonable doubt is a doubt which prompts "a reasonable and prudent person, in
one of the graver and more important transactions of life, to pause and hesitate be-
fore taking the represented facts as true and relying and acting thereon."6
Judges often use the "hesitate to act" explanation in several slight variations of
wording,67 yet it remains nearly meaningless to many jurors.6s Chief Judge Jon 0.
Newman of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit relates that
while
as a district judge I dutifully repeated that bit of 'guidance' to
juries in scores of criminal trials, I was always bemused by its
ambiguity. If the jurors encounter a doubt that would cause
them to 'hesitate to act in a matter of importance,' what are they
to do then? Should they decline to convict because they have
reached a point of hesitation, or should they simply hesitate, then
ask themselves whether, in their own private matters, they would
resolve the doubt in favor of action, and, if so, continue on to
convict?
69
possibly you may be mistaken. You may find an accused guilty upon the
strong probabilities of the case, provided such probabilities are strong
enough to exclude any doubt of his guilt that is reasonable. A reasonable
doubt is an actual and substantial doubt reasonably arising from the evi-
dence, from the facts or circumstances shown by the evidence, or the lack
of evidence on the part of the state, as distinguished from a doubt arising
from mere possibility, from the bare imagination, or from fanciful conjec-
ture.
Id
65. Id at 1251 (quoting Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954)).
66. Victor v. Nebraska, 114 S. CL 1239, 1249 (1994).
67. See Newman, supra note 19, at 982-83 n.14 (citing I LEONAD B. SAND ET AL.,
MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTUCnONS X 4.01, Instruction 4-2 (1993)).
68. Id
69. Id Newman notes that not only is the "hesitate to act" advice ambiguous, but most of
the other phrasings such as guilt "to a moral certainty," and "a doubt based on reason" are also
inadequate. Id He suggests that the "reasonable doubt" instruction would be clearer if courts
used the model charge prepared by the subcommittee of the Judicial Conference's Committee
on the Operation of the Jury System. Id at 991. This charge states, "[p]roof beyond a reason-
able doubt is proof that leaves you firmly convinced of the defendant's guilt." FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CENTER, PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 28, INSTRUCTION 21 (1987) as
quoted in Newman, supra note 19, at 991 n.54. The model charge does not contain any refer-
ence to a "doubt based on reason" or "hesitating on important matters." Newman, supra note
19, at 991. See Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1252 (stating that to find a defendant guilty "without a
reasonable doubt a jury must have proof that leaves them firmly convinced of guilt but not
necessarily overcoming every doubt").
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Some British jurists also find the "hesitate to act" phrasing unclear.70 Additi-
tionally, Justice Ginsburg, in her concurring opinion in Victor v. Nebraska,7 notes
that a committee of federal judges
criticized the "hesitate to act" formulation "because the anal-
ogy it uses seems misplaced. In the decisions people make in the
most important of their own affairs, resolution of conflicts about
past events does not usually play a major role. Indeed, decisions
we make in the most important affairs of our own lives-
choosing a spouse, a job, a place to live, and the like-generally
involve a very heavy element of uncertainty and risk-taking.
They are wholl' unlike the decisions jurors ought to make in
criminal cases." 2
A. CAGE V. LOUISIANA
Despite the apparent confusion surrounding the terms used to describe reason-
able doubt, the Supreme Court has held only once that a definition of reasonable
doubt violated the Due Process Clause.7 In Cage v. Louisiana4 the Supreme
court invalidated the trial court's use of the "the words 'substantial' and 'grave,' as
they are commonly understood."1 5 The court stated that these words "suggest a
70. Uviller, supra note 17, at 36. See id. (quoting Lord Goddard in R. v. Hepworth, R. v.
Feamley, [1955] 2 All E.R. 918, at 919-20). Lord Goddard notes that:
[i]t is very difficult to tell a jury what is a reasonable doubt .... To tell
them that a reasonable doubt is such a doubt as would cause them to hesi-
tate in their own affairs never seems to me to convey any particular stan-
dard; one member of the jury might say he would hesitate over something
and another member might say it would not cause him to hesitate at all.
Id. Lord Goddard further argues that, "[t]o tell a jury that [reasonable doubt] must not be a
fanciful doubt is something that is without any real guidance." Id. Lord Goddard believed that
an understandable definition of reasonable doubt could not be developed and indicated his
preference for an absolute certainty standard, announcing that, "[a] case is never proved if the
jury is left in any degree of doubt." Id
71. 114 S. Ct. 1239 (1994).
72. Victor, 114 S. Ct., at 1252 (quoting FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, PATEM CRMIAL
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 18-19 (1987) (commentary on instruction 21)).
73. Id. at 1243 (stating the Constitution does not prohibit trial courts from defining rea-
sonable doubt or require specific words to be used in the definition as long as the court gives a
reasonable doubt instruction).
74. 498 U.S. 39 (1990).
75. 498 U.S., at 39, 40 (1990). The trial court instructed the jurors:
[A reasonable doubt] is one that is founded upon a real tangible substantial
basis and not upon mere caprice or conjecture. It must be such doubt as
would give rise to a grave uncertainty, raised in your mind by reasons of
the unsatisfactory character of the evidence or lack thereof. A reasonable
doubt is not a mere possible doubt. It is an actual and substantial doubt. It
is a doubt that a reasonable man can seriously entertain. What is required
is not an absolute or mathematical certainty, but a moral certainty.
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higher degree of doubt than is required for acquittal under the reasonable-doubt
standard"76 The Court rendered this instruction unconstitutional because it could
induce a reasonable juror to convict on a lower level of guilt than that which is re-
quired by the Due Process Clause. 7
Commentators attacked the Cage decision for its undue focus on the technical
aspects of the definition.7 8 Critics also noted that the opinion failed to clarify
whether the unconstitutionality of a jury instruction depended upon the presence of
all three critical phrases ("substantial doubt", "grave uncertainty" and "moral cer-
tainty").79 Some courts upheld the necessity of all three phrases,"0 other courts
held that the terms' use together or in isolation unconstitutionally lessened the
prosecutor's burden of proof.81
B. VICTOR V. NEBRASKA
The Court had the opportunity in Victor v. Nebraskar8 to eliminate the confu-
sion resulting from Cagey2 Instead, however, the Court conducted a detailed and
Id at40.
76. Id at41.
77. See id (holding combining instructional words "substantial" and "grave" with the
term "moral certainty" rather than "evidentiary certainty" is unconstitutional).
78. See Uviller, supra note 17, at 35 (criticizing the holding in Cage as a highly technical
reading of the trial court's instructions) Uviller argues that the conviction was so sound and
corroborated by evidence that any distortion in the explanation of the standard could not have
affected the outcome of the trial. Id
79. Matt Nichols, Note., Victor v. Nebraska: The "Reasonable Doubt" Dilemma, 73 N.C.
L. REv. 1709, 1720 (1995). Nichols discussed the Cage Court's criticism of the trial court's
definition of reasonable doubt. Id He further posited whether the presence of all three phrases
is required for a finding of unconstitutionality. Id
80. See Coral v. State, 628 So. 2d 954, 984 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992), cited in Nichols, su-
pra note 79, at 1720 n.96 (stating that "[o]bviously, it was not the use of any one of the terns
in Cage, but rather the combination of all three that rendered the charge in Cage unconstitu-
tional"), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1387 (1994); Bradford v. State, 412 S.E.2d 534, 536 (Ga.
1992) (quoting Starr v. State, 410 S.E.2d 180, 182 (Ga. App. 1991) as quoted in Nichols, su-
pra note 79, at 1720 n..96 (stating that "[]n Cage, it is clear that it .as both the definition of
reasonable doubt, which impermissibly equated reasonable doubt with 'grave uncertainty' and
an 'actual substantial doubt,' coupled with the reference to 'moral and reasonable certainty'
that invalidated the jury instruction"); see also Smith v. State, 588 So. 2d 561, 568-69 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1991) (finding use of the terms "moral certainty" and "actual and substantial
doubt" but not "grave uncertainty" injury instructions constitutes a proper instruction).
81. See Nichols, supra note 79, at 1720-21 (citing State v. Bryant, 432 S.E.2d 291 (N.C.
1993)) (holding that the crucial term condemned by the Court in Cage was "moral certainty")
vacated, 114 S. Ct. 1365, on remand, 446 S.E.2d 71 (N.C. 1994); see also Morley v. Stenba-r,
828 F. Supp. 1413 (D. Neb. 1993), rev'd, 25 F.3d 687 (8th Cir. 1994) (concluding that the
phrases "actual and substantial doubt," "moral certainty," and "strong probabilities," wrhen
used either together or separately, are unconstitutional because they lessen the level of guilt
needed to be established by the prosecutor).
82. 114 S. Ct. 1239 (1994).
83. See Brief for the State of Nebraska at 9, Victor v. Nebraska, 114 S. Ct. 1239 (1994)
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lengthy historical analysis, relying on eighteenth and nineteenth century cases and
texts to determine how a contemporary jury would be likely to understand the
meaning of the "reasonable doubt" instructions.
84
The Court began by explaining that "[tihe government must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt every element of a charged offense."85 It then reaffirnmed that the
Constitution neither prohibits nor requires that the trial court define reasonable
doubt as a matter of routine 86 so long as the trial court instructs the jury that the
prosecutor must prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.8 7 The
Court also noted that "the Constitution does not require that any particular form of
words be used in advising the jury of the government's burden of proof' 88 so long
as "taken as a whole, the instructions correctly convey the concept of reasonable
doubt to the jury."8 9
The Victor Court did not take the opportunity to provide an acceptable defini-
tion of reasonable doubt.90 In its preoccupation with the legal sufficiency of the
instructions, the Court failed to recognize that legally correct instructions may be
incomprehensible to the average juror.9'
C. FEDERAL JUDICIARY CENTER'S MODEL INSTRUCTIONS
In her concurring opinion in Victor v. Nebraska,92 Justice Ginsburg submits an
alternative to the choice between leaving "reasonable doubt" undefined so as to
give the jury no instruction as to its meaning, or defining the term, using obsolete
terminology such as "moral certainty" or the "misplaced analogy of 'hesitation to
(No. 92-8894) (arguing the courts need to solve the confusion caused by Cage).
84. Victor, 114 S. Ct., at 1245-49. The Victor court discussed the evolution of "moral
evidence" and "moral certainty," and concluded that the jury's understanding of "moral cer-
tainty" as suggesting a lower standard of proof than due process requires, or as allowing con-
viction on factors other than the government's proof, was unlikely. Id. The Court also noted
that they did not condone the use of the phrase because the definition of "moral certainty" had
changed since it was used in the Webster instruction and it may continue to do so until it con-
flicts with the Winship standard. Id. at 1248. The Court concluded, however, by noting that
they have no supervisory powers over the state courts and could not say that in the context of
the whole instruction the use of the term "moral certainty" was unconstitutional. Id.
85. Id at 1242 (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)).
86. Id. at 1243 (citing Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430, 440-41 (1887)).
87. Id. (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 320 n.14 (1979)).
88. Id (citing Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478,485-86 (1978)).
89. Victor, 114 S. Ct., at 1243 (citing Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140
(1954)).
90. See Kenney, supra note 33, at 989 (commenting that Justice O'Connor did not render
an ideal jury instruction regarding reasonable doubt and thus did not resolve the confusion re-
garding the issue).
91. See id at 1013-14 (noting that because the Court relied on early cases to analyze the
meaning of reasonable doubt it did not address whether the meanings of key terms had
changed over time).
92. Victor, 114 S. Ct, at 1252 (Ginsburg, J. concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
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act,"' 93 and thereby completely confusing the jury. Justice Ginsburg notes with
approval that the Federal Judicial Center proposed a "clear, straightforward, and
accurate" definition of reasonable doubt.9 The key sentence in this definition is,
"[p]roof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly convinced of
the defendant's guilt."95 This definition, like every definition of reasonable doubt
before it, has received less than universal acceptance.9!
Some speculate that the reason many courts have difficulty accepting a defini-
tion of reasonable doubt, such as that provided by the Federal Judicial Center,, is
93. Id
94. Id (quoting the FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENarE, PATEw CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIO.N 17-
18 (1987) (instruction 21)). The instruction reads in part:
As I have said many times, the government has the burden of proving the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Some of you may have
served as jurors in civil cases, where you were told that it is only nece-ssay
to prove a fact is more likely true than not true. In criminal cases, the
government's proof must be more powerful than that. It must be beyond a
reasonable doubt. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves
you firmly convinced of the defendant's guilt. There are very few things
in this world that we know with absolute certainty, and in criminal cases
the law does not require proof that overcomes every possible doubt. K1
based on your consideration of the evidence, you are firmly convinced
that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged, you must find him guilty.
IC on the other hand, you think there is a real possibility that he is not
guilty, you must give him the benefit of the doubt and find him not guilty.
Id.
95. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENIER, PATrERN CR IMNAL JURY INsTRUCTION 17-18 (1987). See
Newman, supra note 19, at 991 (observing that the instruction "contains very useful lan-
guage").
96. See Newman, supra note 19, at 991 (musing that "[f]or reasons not clear to me, this
authoritatively formulated model instruction has not been widely adopted"); see also Nichols,
supra note 79, at 1734 n.212 (citing a number of cases in which the circuits have been critical
of the Federal Judicial Center's Pattern Instruction). See generally United States v. Velasquez,
980 F.2d 1275 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting a preference for the "hesitate to act" phrase in jury in-
structions), cert. denied, 113 S.CL 2979 (1993); United States v. Barrera-Gonzales, 952 F.2d
1269 (10th Cir. 1992) (stating the court prefers the "hesitate to act" charge). The court notes
that use of the phrase "firmly convinced" places a greater burden on the prosecution than
"reasonable certainty" or "abiding conviction as to guilt" in reasonable doubt instructions. Id
at 1273. See also United States v. Porter, 821 F.2d 968 (4th Cir. 1987) (noting non-reversible
error in using the phrase "'firmly convinced' of guilt" in reasonable doubt instructions), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 934 (1988); United States v. McBride, 786 F.2d 45, 52 (2d Cir. 1986)
(suggesting language in the Federal Judicial Center's proposed instruction is confusing and
may prompt jurors to mistakenly place burden of proof on the defense); United States v. Gib-
son, 726 F.2d 869 (1st Cir.) (finding language in the Federal Judicial Center's reasonable
doubt instruction confusing as to which side must bear the burden of proof), cert. denied, 466
U.S. 960 (1984).
97. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONl 17-18 (1987)
(instruction 21).
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that the primary goal of some jurists in providing instructions is to avoid being
overturned on appeal, rather than to enlighten the jury.93 In Sullivan v. Louisiana"
the Court held that a judge who gives the jury a constitutionally deficient reason-
able doubt instruction commits a constitutional error, and thereby could supply the
basis for overturning the conviction on appeal. 1'0 Thus, the stakes are high, and a
deficient instruction will likely result in an automatic reversal.' 0'
II. RECURRENT PROBLEMS
A. REASONABLE DOUBT UNDEFINED
If it is so difficult and risky for jurists in the United States to define the concept
of reasonable doubt for the members of the jury perhaps it is better to leave the
term undefined. This is not a new idea. As previously noted, the Supreme Court
observed in 1880, in Miles v. United States,12 that attempts to explain reasonable
doubt to the jury are usually unsuccessful.103 The fact that the definition provided
is often incomprehensible, however, does not necessarily mean that the court
should not provide a defmition.1 4
Commentators point out that the term is capable of definition, 0 5 and studies
show that while the legal language used in jury instructions often results in juror
confusion, 16 jurors are frequently even more confused when terms such as reason-
98. See, e.g., Diamond, supra note 18, at 1725 (stating that the primary motive for many
judges' refusal to define reasonable doubt is a fear that they will be overturned on appeal if the
instructions are found constitutionally deficient); Steele & Thornburg, supra note 16, at 98-99.
The authors explain that "judges who draft jury instructions... are unlikely to risk having a
case reversed on appeal because they failed to use language already approved by the appellate
court" ); Amiram Elwork et al., Juridic Decisions: In Ignorance of the Law or in Light of It?, I
LAw& HuM. BEmv. 163, 164 (1977). Elwork states "judges are acutely aware of the fact that
the presentation of legally inaccurate instructions is a very frequent cause for reversals by up-
pellate courts. Thus they often sacrifice comprehensibility and spend a great deal of time
piecing together quotations from statutes and appellate court decisions in order to ensure legal
accuracy." Id
99. 113 S. Ct. 2078 (1993).
100. See Kenney, supra note 18, at 995 & n.46 (citing Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct.
2078, 2082 (1993)).
101. Id
102. 103 U.S. 304 (1880).
103. Id at312.
104. See Diamond, supra note 18, at 1724. "[A]lthough reasonable doubt is not a precise
concept, its meaning can be made more clear through definition." Id. Diamond further notes
that some jurists are reluctant to provide a definition of reasonable doubt to the jury because, as
the Court observed in Miles, efforts to explain the term are usually unsuccessful. Id. at 1724
n.78. Nevertheless, Diamond suggests that the Court's observation does not imply that a good
definition is impossible, or that understandable definitions do not help the jury. Id. at 1724.
105. Ia
106. Id at 1723.
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able doubt are left undefined.10 7 Advocates of leaving reasonable doubt undefined,
however, look to the labored efforts of judges over the past one hundred years to
construct an adequate definition as evidence of the near impossibility of further
defining the term.103 They conclude that the term is best left undefined because
jurors, as representatives of the community, are then free to apply the values of the
community to their interpretation of the meaning.'0 Although commentators rec-
ognize that "reliance on jury discretion to define reasonable doubt may raise the
specter of juries unguided by the rule of law,"110 some resolve this possibility by
noting that instructions that leave reasonable doubt undefined do not leave jurors
free to apply any standard."' The commentators note that the effect of instructions
is to determine "the precise meaning of the standard within the limits of the phrase
'proof beyond a reasonable doubt."' 2
B. REASONABLE DOUBT DEFINED
Other commentators are convinced that allowing every juror to interpret the
term "reasonable doubt" according to his or her personal definition will result in
improper application of the standard.13 Advocates of defining reasonable doubt
107. See Reasonable Doubt, supra note 16, at 1966-67 (citing Norbert L. Kerr ct al., Guilt
Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: Effects of Concept Definition and Assigned Decision Rule on the
Judgements of Mock Jurors, 34 J. PERsONALrIY & Soc. PSYCHOL 282, 235-86 (1976))
(relating that while providing a definition may decrease feelings of uncertainty for jurors, a
false sense of certainty may detract them from their deliberations).
108. d at 1968-70.
109. Ia at 1972. "Because reasonable doubt is an inherently amorphous term that demands
value judgment[s] in its application, the jury is best suited, as a representative body of the
community, to determine its meaning." Id The author points out that "part of the meaning of
the words 'reasonable doubt' is to indicate that a value judgment is required." kd at 1971
n109 (quoting Jeremy Waldron, Vagueness in Lmv and Language: Some Philosophical Is-
sues, 82 CAL. L. REv. 509, 510 (1994) as quoted in Reasonable Doubt, supra note, 16 at 1971
n.109. "Rather than obscuring the need for such Judgments with the 'garbled verbiage' of an
attempted definition, courts should require jurors to confront the vagueness inherent in the
concept" Ia at 1971.
110. Id at 1971.
111. Id
112. Reasonable Doubt, supra note 16, at 1971.
113. See, e.g., Diamond, supra note 18, at 1728 n.97.
"For example, some lay jurors probably understand the proof beyond a
reasonable doubt standard as being equivalent to proof beyond any doubt,
while others may understand it as requiring that guilt be proved as being
only more likely than not. Both of these interpretations are incorrect. The
first requires a standard of proof that is too high,... and the second one
requires one which is too low, being equivalent to a legal insider's under-
standing of the 'preponderance of the evidence' standard that is used in
civil eases.. "
Id See also 1 L. SAND Er AL., MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCtION § 4.01 (1989) cited in
Diamond, supra note 18, at 1726 n.87 (stating jurors interpret the reasonable doubt standard as
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note that an undefined standard allows the fact-finder an opportunity to invent and
manipulate rather than follow a prescribed path. 14 Some of these advocates con-
clude that subjecting the standard to such inconsistent treatment reduces the stan-
dard to "form without substance" that a jury cannot rationally apply.1 3
Both sets of critics, those who favor definition and those who do not, criticize
the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard as unsatisfactory.1 6 One side advocates
that to define only leads to jury confusion due to a misunderstanding of the defini-
tion given to them.1 7 The opposition critics counter that to not define may lead to
an outcome inconsistent with the evidence because the jurors will not rationally
apply the standard of reasonable doubt." 8 One could also make the argument that,
regardless of whether a reasonable doubt standard is ill defined or not defined at
all, jurors may not rationally apply the standard." 9
proof beyond reasonable doubt); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365-66 (1970) (finding other
jurors may use too low of a reasonable doubt standard).
114. Uviller, supra note 17, at 38. "To a jury .... the bare standard Is an invitation to
clothe it by invention, its flexibility an opportunity to bend it to preconfigured purposes." Id.
Uviller further notes that "[i]n fact, some efforts by individual judges to clarify the delphic
phrase make it more meaningful to the jurors who are forced to use it in a specific case". Id.
115. Diamond, supra note 18, at 1728. See Symposium, Improving Communications in the
Courtroom, 68 IND. L. J. 1037, 1040 (1993).
If juries are not understanding instructions, or if they are being biased by
instructions, is that the system we have contracted to have? I think juries
will often apply commonly accepted norms to come up with the result, but
the questions remain: Are they applying the law? And are we as much a
society of law as we want to be if the juries do not quite understand what
it is they are supposed to be deciding?
Id (statement of Steven J. Adler, News Editor for Law, WALL STREET JOUR AL). But see
Uviller, supra note 17, at 19 (arguing that defining reasonable doubt usurps juror common
sense).
116. See Symposium, supra note 115, at 1040 (questioning jury understanding of reason-
able doubt standard even with instruction); Uviller, supra note 17, at 20 (asserting standard
reasonable doubt instructions often do not make sense).
117. Diamond, supra note 18, at 1720.
118. Symposium, supra note 115, at 1020.
119. Mansnerus, supra note 6, at A4 (noting that Jeffrey Abramson, a professor of politics
and legal studies at Brandeis University, related that, based on the reactions of his students, the
Simpson case convinced many that "verdicts are like straws in the wind, blowing with the
demographics."). But see Jordan, supra note 1, at 2 (writing before the verdict in the O.J.
Simpson case and noting that lawyers see things "vastly differently than lay people"). Al-
though lawyers see weaknesses in the Simpson defense case, the "arcane concept" of reason-
able doubt works because,
it requires each juror to react viscerally to the nagging question in the back
of their minds about guilt. While it may appear artificial to acquit in the
face of strong evidence, the instruction forbids such conviction unless the
juror has resolved all doubts in favor of the prosecution .... the public, if
not the jury, certainly seems to have a reasonable doubt about Simpson's
guilt.
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III. ALTERNATIVES
Given the shortcomings surrounding existing reasonable doubt jury instruc-
tions, it is natural to wonder if there is a better way. Legal systems of other coun-
tries may provide an instructive method for determining the guilt or innocence of a
criminal defendant that is superior to the method used in the United States. Many
commentators note, however, that the United States legal community has shown a
distinct historical and ongoing disinterest in the legal structures or methods of for-
eign countries. °
Professors Frase and Weigend associate several problems with using foreign
systems of criminal justice as models for the United States.12 1 First, they note that
often those proposing foreign systems fail to look at the system as a whole, but fo-
cus solely on the part they propose to adopt.'2 Second, the proposals tend to focus
on the formal conceptualized methods and organizations and generally ignore data
which shows how the system actually performs."3 Third, instead of focusing on
more modest, incremental changes, the proposals often advocate major changes
that radically differ from the American system.
124
120. See Ernst C. Stiefel & James R. Maxeiner, Civil Justice Reform in the United States-
Opportunity for Learning from "Civilized" European Procedure Instead of Contilmed Isola-
tion?, 42 AM. J. Coop. L. 147, 155 (1994) (noting that lawyers, judges and academics in the
United States possess a low level of interest and knowledge in foreign law). Although Ameri-
can lawyers often present the United States system as a model for the formerly Communist
countries they do not study the foreign systems to aid in reforming the United States system.
Id See also Donald EJ. Mac Namara, 17 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 825 (1994) (reviewing Paul
O'Mahony, CRiE Am PuNIsmsNT iN IREA (1993)) (Book Review) (listing a number of
factors that contribute to the lack of interest in comparative justice in American law schools).
Mac Namara argues that the long history of American isolationism has resulted in a "narrow
parochialism" that evaluates things against the American paradigm and gives a negative view
to those legal issues or structures which are even slightly different than ours. Id See also
Carol D. Rasnic, Making the Criminal Defendant's Punislment Fit the Crime: The Contrast
Between German and US. Laws ofSentencing, 7 N.Y. INT'L L. REv. 62, 62 (1994) (noting
those in the legal profession often have "tunnel vision" with respect to the law). Rasnic con-
tends that "[1lawyers and professors of law typically disregard as inferior those legal ap-
proaches taken by other civilized countries which are distinct from those in the United States."
Id See generally Stephen P. Freccero, An Introduction to the New Italian Criminal Procedure,
21 AM. J. CRa. L. 345 (1994) (writing that "[flor the last twenty-five years, the Italian crimi-
nal justice system has been undergoing a period of major reform, [an occurrence] which has
gone largely unrecognized in the American literature.").
121. Richard S. Frase & Thomas Weigand, German Criminal Justice as a Guide to Ameri-
can Law Reform: Similar Problems, Better Solutions?, 18 B.C. I'rL & COMP. L. REv. 317,
318 (1995) (analyzing common mistakes made in comparing the American criminal justice
system with foreign systems).
122. See Id (suggesting that previous American writers failed to accurately analyze foreign
criminal justice systems).
123. Id
124. Id
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Despite these shortfalls, and the major differences between the criminal justice
systems of the United States and Germany, for example, Frase and Weigend con-
clude that there are many underlying similarities and the two systems are suffi-
ciently compatible to permit certain American reforms based on desirable features
of the German system.'2 The lesson is that it is beneficial to study the systems of
other countries, so long as one views the reforms from an American perspective.
A. THE ACCUSATORIAL LEGAL SYSTEM
The legal systems of the United States, England, Canada and Australia, the
Anglo-American (or common law) systems, are often termed "accusatorial" sys-
tems.126 The accusatorial system developed in England in conjunction with the
jury trial 127 and later spread to the United States and throughout the British Em-
pire. 28 The accusatorial system pits a prosecutor against a defense attorney and
each argues his case before a neutral adjudicator. 129
B. CANADA
Keeping the cautions of Professors Frase and Weigend firmly in mind, it is in-
teresting to note how a United States neighbor, Canada's Court of Appeals in
British Columbia, recently approached its review of reasonable doubt.' 3° The
court's conclusions may provide lessons for the United States judicial system.
In Regina v. Brydon,1 3 1 decided in 1995, five members of British Columbia's
Court reviewed a voluminous amount of material containing numerous articles and
previous court decisions to assist them in their review of reasonable doubt. 32 Al-
though one member of the five judge panel expressed some reservations, 33 the
125. Id
126. Freccero, supra note 120, at 348 n.10.
127. Shapiro, To a Moral Certainty, supra note 9, at 155.
128. See id. at 153 (tracing the development of the Anglo-American jury system).
129. Freccero, supra note 120, at 348 n.10.
130. See Regina v. Brydon, [1995] 95 C.C.C. (3d) 509 (holding reasonable doubt should be
based on reason, not speculation, sympathy or prejudice).
131. [1995] 95 C.C.C. (3d) 509.
132. See Editorial, What is Reasonable Doubt?, VANCOUVER SUN, Feb. 9, 1995, at A17
(noting that lawyers for the appellant and the Crown assembled twelve volumes of material
containing numerous articles and more than 100 decisions to assist the judges in determining
"what is reasonable doubt").
133. See Brydon, 95 C.C.C. (3d) at 512 (noting that the court should not interfere with the
independence of the trial judge). Justice Gibbs asserts that "[p]assing on words and phrases
and model forms of charges in the abstract overlooks the enormous advantage enjoyed by the
trial judge by reason of being present throughout the trial." Id The court responds that the rea-
sonable doubt standard of proof is a "principle of fundamental justice" and a
legally sound instruction on that standard is thus essential to a fair trial.
Central to such instruction is a legally accurate definition of what consti-
tutes reasonable doubt. It follows that trial judges must be able to estab-
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justices developed a model instruction to the jury concerning reasonable doubt
which focuses on the concept that a reasonable doubt is a doubt that "if you asked
yourself why do I doubt?-you can assign a logical reason by way of an an-
swer."' 34 The court offered that "[als an additional instruction on the standard of
proof, the jury could be instructed that 'proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof
that leaves the jury firmly convinced of the accused's guilt'."' '35 Finally, the court
cautioned against equating "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" with "moral cer-
tainty," because the latter adds little to a workable definition of reasonable
doubt
136
lish with certainty which instructions on the standard are approved and
which should be avoided as offering the potential for reversible error. The
importance of any guidance this court can offer in that respect seems ob-
vious.
Id at 516.
134. Id at 511. The court provided a full model charge to the jury which reads:
A reasonable doubt is exactly what it says-a doubt based on reason-on
the logical processes of the mind. It is not a fanciful or speculative doubt,
nor is it a doubt based upon sympathy or prejudice. It is the sort of doubt
which, if you asked yourself; "Why do I doubt?"--you can assign a logi-
cal reason by way of an answer. A logical reason in this context means a
reason connected either to the evidence itself; including any conflict you
may find exists after considering the evidence as a whole, or to an absence
of evidence which in the circumstances of this case you believe is essential
to conviction.
Id The court went on to state that as to the standard of proof, the jury could b- instructed as
follows:
You must not base your doubt on the proposition that nothing is certain or
impossible or that anything is possible. You are not entitled to set up a
standard of absolute certainty and to say that the evidence does not meas-
ure up to that standard. In many things it is impossible to prove absolute
certainty. It after a careful consideration of all the evidence in this case,
there remains in your mind a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the ac-
cused, the Crown has failed to meet the standard of proof which the law
requires, the presumption of innocence prevails and you must-not may-
acquit On the other hand, if a careful consideration of all the evidence
leaves you with no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused, the pre-
sumption of innocence has been displaced and it is your duty to convict.
Id at 512.
135. Id See id at 539 (noting use of the term "firmly convinced"). This represents an adop-
tion of the same term developed by the Federal Judicial Center in pattern criminal jury instruc-
tion 17-18. FEDERAL JUDIcIAL CENTER, PATTERN CIMINAL JURY INSRUCIn'ON 17-18 (1987).
Additionally, the Brydon court, a Canadian tribunal, takes notice of Justice Ginsburg's opinion
that "[p]roof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly convinced of the de-
fendant's guilt". Victor v. Nebraska, 114 S. Ct. 1239, 1253 (1994).
136. See Brydon, 95 C.C.C. (3d) at 514 (finding that the use of the expressions "moral cer-
tainty," "feel sure," "real doubt," "substantial doubt" and "serious doubt" in jury instructions
insufficiently conveys the level of certitude necessary to convict and may lessen the prosecu-
tor's burden of proof).
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The court's thoughtful analysis reviews a number of the definitions of reason-
able doubt offered over the years and provides a critique of each. 137 The court
137. See id at 52340 (discussing and critiquing various definitions of "reasonable doubt"
within jury instructions). The first definition of reasonable doubt the court discusses is "a
doubt based upon reason as opposed to a doubt based upon imagination or speculation." Id. at
524. The court notes that some believe this definition is "dangerously" wrong because it im-
plies a need to articulate a reason for the doubt; others favor it because it accurately describes
reasonable doubt as doubt for which a reason can be given. Id. Second, the court discusses
proof beyond a reasonable doubt as "being achieved when there is moral certainty that the ac-
cused committed the offence." Id at 528. The court notes that while instructions equating
moral certainty and reasonable doubt have achieved widespread acceptance, it has also been
"criticized as antiquated, contradictory, and meaningless in both academic writings and judicial
opinions." Id. at 529. The court then concludes such instructions could amount to reversible
error. Id. at 530. Third, the court explains that "if you conclude that the accused probably
committed the offence and no more, then you have a reasonable doubt." Id. at 531. Although
the court supports the use of common language so long as the "legal precision" is maintained,
it expresses concern that the word "probably" has evolved into a "belief in guilt far below that
which is constitutionally required for a criminal conviction." Id. Fourth, the court discusses
that, "if you... feel sure the accused committed the offenses, you do not have a reasonable
doubt." Id. at 532. The court expresses concern at the use of the words "feel," deciding it con-
notes an emotional rather than reasoned response, and "sure," explaining it does not adequately
convey the necessary level of certitude. Id Fifth, the court discusses the instruction that, "loin
the other hand, you must not set up a standard of absolute certainty that the [government] must
meet in order to prove guilt" Id at 533. The court acknowledges the long-term use of this in-
struction without "convincing criticism" and the court remarks on the utility of the construc-
tion. Id. Sixth, the court explains reasonable doubt as a "real," "substantial," "honest,"
"sensible," and "serious" doubt, and notes that these are "quantitative modifiers" and "often
lead to reversible error." Id. Seventh, commenting upon another qualitative definition, the
court discusses reasonable doubt as "a doubt that would cause a person to hesitate to act in
his/her everyday affairs, or the most important of his/her own affairs." Id. at 534. The court
also takes notice of the Subcommittee on Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions' 1987 report to the
Federal Judicial Center which recommended against the further use of any form of such anal-
ogy instructions. Id. at 536. The court concludes, in any event, if the instruction is used it
should always be equated to the sort of doubt which would cause one to hesitate to act in a
most important (as opposed to everyday) affair. Id. at 534-36. Eighth, the court discusses rea-
sonable doubt as "a doubt which you the jury decide is reasonable in the circumstances of this
particular case." Id at 537. The court acknowledges that this is an approved charge in New
Zealand and Australia, but British Columbia has never used it. Id at 538. The use of this in-
struction would likely constitute reversible error because it assumes that any doubt the jury has
in a particular case, which is not necessarily rooted in the evidence, is a reasonable doubt. Id
Ninth, the court discusses proof beyond a reasonable doubt as "proof that convinces the mind
and satisfies the conscience." Id The court finds while some find this definition a logical ex-
planation, others, including this court, believe this "imports notions of subjectively held val-
ues" which cannot legally satisfy an objective standard. Id. Further, the court discusses the
1987 Federal Judicial Center, Pattern Criminal Jury Instruction 17-18. The Brydon court ex-
plains the Federal Judicial Center's depiction of proof beyond a reasonable doubt as "proof
that leaves you firmly convinced of the defendant's guilt." Id. at 539. Further, the Brydon
court concurs with Judge Ginsburg's favorable impression of Instruction 17-18. Id. at 53940.
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then offers two conclusions which emerge from that analysis. 138 First, there is an
objective reasonable doubt. All doubts are not reasonable. 139 Second, qualitative
definitions of reasonable doubt are preferred. 40 The court found the quantitative
definitions "invite a subjective approach" to the standard of reasonable doubt
which presents an "unacceptable risk of reversible error."'1
41
Throughout this analysis, the court cited not only Canadian case law, but also
cases decided in the United States.142 Unlike most cases and legal articles in the
United States, 143 this court did not restrict its analysis to those concepts used by
their fellow Canadian or British citizens. 1'4 The Court's openness was refreshing
and should serve as a model for the United States.
C. ENGLAND
The beyond a reasonable doubt standard represents a keystone of the criminal
justice system in both the United States and England over the past two hundred
years. 14  The English judiciary, like its American counterpart, despairs of ever
See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Ginsburg's acknowledgment
of Instruction 17-18). Finally, the court discusses the instruction that, "[y]ou must not convict
the accused unless you have excluded every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence."
Brydon, 95 C.C.C., at 540. The court takes notice that Canada has used this standard, known
as the "Cooper Instruction," for a long time when considering circumstantial evidence, and
should continue to use the standard, but only in the context of circumstantial evidence. kd at
540.
138. Brydon, 95 C.C.C. (3d) at 541.
139. See id at 541 (concluding objective definition of reasonable doubt is inferior to
qualitative definition). "Mhe concept [of reasonable doubt] is objectively [rather than subjec-
tively] limited. Not all doubts are reasonable." Id The court then fails to provide any further
explanation of this point. Id One may argue that while the concept is objectively limited,
drawing the line between a reasonable doubt and an unreasonable doubt is a subjective distinc-
tion. Different individuals will interpret the definition differently, regardless of the definition
of reasonable doubt provided by the court.
140. See id at 541-43 (explaining utility of qualitative definition). Qualitative definitions,
such as those which define reasonable doubt as "a doubt based on reason," or "a rational
doubt," or "a doubt for which, if you ask yourself; you can give a reason," are preferable to
quantitative definitions, such as a "real" doubt, a "serious" doubt, or a "substantial" doubt. Id
141. Id
142. See idt at 528-30 & 536-37 (citing, among other United States cases. Commonwealth
v. Webster, 59 Mass. 295 (1850), Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121 (1954), United States
v. Lawson, 581 F.2d 664 (7th Cir. 1978), and Victor v. Nebraska, 112 S. Ct. 1239 (1994)).
143. See Mac Namara, supra note 120, at 825 (noting the narrow focus of the American
legal institution).
144. See supra note 142 (citing specific United States case law).
145. See generally SHAPiao, supra note 21 (tracing the history of the beyond a reasonable
doubt standard through early English and United States history). Furthermore, see David Pan-
nick, Jurors Who Are in Reasonable Doubt, THE TINis (LONDON), Jan. 17, 1995 available in
LEXIS, News Library, Non-U.S. file, who states that:
Every jury hearing a criminal trial in the Crown Court is told by the judge
that the defendant is entitled to a verdict of not guilty unless the prosecu-
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being able to define reasonable doubt. 4 6 Contemporary English commentators
and barristers find it "troubling that a legal concept so central to every criminal
trial has been considered by the English judiciary to be so fragile that any attempt
to explain it for the benefit of lay people risks confusion and error."
147
Unlike the United States, however, the British Court of Appeals, in 1976, gave
a strong warning to judges not to attempt to put "any gloss on what is meant by
'sure' or what is meant by 'reasonable doubt'.' 148 The court noted that in the past
twenty years faulty instructions regarding reasonable doubt have provided the ba-
sis for appeal in numerous cases. 149 Reasonable doubt remains undefined in Eng-
lish jurisprudence. 50
D. AUSTRALIA
Australia also employs the reasonable doubt standard.' 5' In a recent case, the
Supreme Court of South Australia reaffirmed the South Australian rule that any
attempt to define the term "a reasonable doubt" for the jury will result in a mis-
trial. 152 Further, if the jury asks for a definition, the judge should offer only that "a
reasonable doubt is one which they, as reasonable persons, are prepared to enter-
tain.
,,153
tion has made the jury sure of the defendant's guilt. Somejudges add that
being sure of the defendant's guilt means the same as being satisfied of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id.
146. See Regina v. Summers, 36 Crim. App. 14 (Eng. 1952) (opining that the court has yet
to hear a true definition of what is "reasonable doubt"). The English court concluded that the
better decision would be to discard the expression because attempts at explanation often "result
in confusion rather than clarity." Id
147. Pannick, supra note 145, at 2.
148. Regina v. Ching, 63 Crim. App. 7, 10 (Eng. 1976).
149. Id. at 1I. The court concluded, "[w]e point out and emphasize that if judges stopped
trying to define that which is almost impossible to define, there would be fewer appeals." Id.
150. See Pannick, supra note 145, at 2 (noting that English law has not adopted a positive
definition of reasonable doubt). Pannick asserts that the court is "wedded to the approach" that
attempts to explain "reasonable doubt" which often "results in confusion rather than clarity."
151. See Regina v. Gebert (1992) 60 SA. St. R1 110, 1992 AUST SASC LEXIS 461, at *6
(Austl. 1992) (citing The Queen v. Bilick, 36 S.A. St. R. 321 (Austl., 1984)). "The question of
law is whether on the evidence as it stands the defendant could lawfully be convicted. He
could lawfully be convicted on the evidence only if it is capable of producing in the minds of a
reasonable jury satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.
152. See id at *21 (citing The Queen v. Britten, 51 S.A. St. R. 567, 573 (Austl., 1988))
(acknowledging "[a]n attempt to characterize a reasonable doubt is a misdirection").
153. See id (citing The Queen v. Wilson, 42 S.A. St. R. 203, 207 (Austl., 1986)) (stating
"[t]hese cases establish that if some amplification [of reasonable doubt] is desired, the direction
should go no further than to tell the jury that a reasonable doubt is 'one which they, as reason-
able persons, are prepared to entertain"').
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E. THE INQuIsrroRiAL SYsTEM
As the jury trial system emerged in England lm the Roman-canon "inquisitorial
system" began to develop on the Continent. 5  The inquisitorial system differs
from the accusatorial system in that state officials who have the authority to inves-
tigate, initiate, and adjudicate criminal cases control the inquisitorial system.155
Germany, France, and until recently, Italy,
157 employ inquisitorial legal systems. 153
A recent study concluded that the criminal justice systems of Germany, and to a
lesser extent, France, share many similarities with the United States criminal jus-
tice system and appear to be heading toward a single model as the inquisitorial
systems become more adversarial and due-process oriented."5 9
F. GERMANY
The German criminal justice system is an inquisitorial system'( that uses a
combination of professional judges sharing the bench with lay judges16 1 instead of
154. See Shapiro, To a Moral Certainy supra note 9, at 155 (tracing the development of
the Anglo-Americanjury system).
155. See id (stating that the Roman-canon inquisition process on the Continent and the jury
trial system in England replaced the "irrational proofs" system such as trial by ordeal).
156. Freccero, supra note 120, at 348 n.10.
157. See id at 348-49 (stating that Italy's new code of criminal procedure enacted in 1989
transformed its inquisitorial criminal justice system into an accusatorial system).
158. See id (explaining that Italy's prior criminal justice process closely res:embled the in-
quisitorial systems of France and Germany).
159. See Frase & Weigand, supra note 121, at 359-60 (noting that some criminal justice
systems, such as Germany's, are moving faster toward a due process-orientated model than
others). Professors Frase and Weigand note that "[tihe increasing similarity of German and
American practices suggests that these two systems are sufficiently compatible to permit re-
form "borroving' from Germany to the United States, and vice versa." Id See also, Freccero,
supra note 120, at 347 (explaining that the Italian criminal justice system underwent a period
of major reform after more than ten years of study). These reforms attempted to bring the
Code of Criminal Procedure "in line with the liberal democratic values and principles of Italy's
post-war Constitution." Id
160. See MAJoR CRPfNAL JUSTICE SYsTims: A COoPARATIVE SURvEy 124 (George F.
Cole et al. eds., 2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter MAJOR CRn.mIAL JUSTICE SYSTlEs] (noting features
of the German system that emphasize its inquisitorial nature). In the German system, prior to
trial, the police and prosecutor give a record of the case to the judge who then decides the order
in which he will call the witnesses and have the evidence presented. Id In a German court-
room there is no distinction between an examination-in-chief and cross-examination, and the
judge questions the witnesses directly to satisfy himself regarding their reliability and accu-
racy. Id Hearsay evidence is admissible; the theory is that the judge can distinguish the pro-
bative value. Id Overall, prosecutor and defense counsel play relatively minor roles. Id
161. Frase & Weigand, supra note 121, at 321. See JOHN H. LANGBEIl, COMiPARATVE
CRanmAL PROCEDURE: GERmuiy 141 (1977) (explaining the selection process of German lay
judges). Every four years lists of those eligible for selection as German lay judges are com-
piled; candidates include both men and women who represent a cross section of the population.
Id Not included are "wards, ex-convicts, those under 25 or over 70, imbeciles, persons se-
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a jury.162 The court presumes the innocence of the accused until proven guilty.' 63
The government must convince the court of the accused's guilt based on an accu-
mulation of factors which "leave no room for reasonable doubt."' 64 This is nearly
identical to the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard used in the United States.165
German law requires that "in evaluating the evidence, the court shall decide ac-
cording to its free [fieie, 'free' in the sense of 'unrestricted'] conviction, derived
from the entire trial."'' 1 This standard does not, however, permit the court to
convict on a hunch or a whim; it is bound by the maxim in dubio pro reo: "in
doubt, decide for the accused."' 167 As an additional safeguard against arbitrary de-
cisions, the German law also requires that the judge submit a detailed written ra-
tionale of the court's deliberative process.1
68
Unlike their counterparts in the United States, German lay judges do not receive
prior instructions on the various applicable standards of proof or substantive
law. 169 Instead, the professional justices on the panel instruct the lay judges infor-
mally during in camera deliberations. 70 Commentators note that this method may
be more efficient than the Anglo-American System.'17
verely handicapped, persons who have lived in the locality for less than a year, clergy, law pro-
fessionals, certain high public officials, and so forth." Id.
162. See Frase & Weigand, supra note 121, at 321.
163. See MAJOR CRIMIAL JusTIcE SYsTEMS: A COMvARATvE SURVEY, supra note 160, at
123 (noting that under German law the accused never has the burden either of persuasion or of
producing evidence, and if there is more than one judge presiding, a two-thirds majority is
needed to convict).
164. See Frase & Weigand, supra note 121, at 344 (noting that the court must be subjec-
tively convinced of the defendant's guilt and the conviction must be based on persuasive fac-
tors leaving no reasonable doubt).
165. See id (stating that the standards used in the United States and Germany are very
similar).
166. LANGBEIN, supra note 161, at 78 (quoting § 261 StPO). Langbein notes that "this so-
called principle of free evaluation of the evidence" is one of the most important principles in
the code of criminal procedure and "means that the court decides according to the subjective
persuasion of its members." Id Further, when judges examine the evidence and reach a deci-
sion "they are not bound by any formal or objective criteria." Id Langbein notes that the free
evaluation principle "is the successor to the objective theory of proof that produced the system
ofjudicial torture" to obtain confessions in order to achieve the necessary degree of certainty to
convict the accused. Id at 78-9.
167. Id at79.
168. Frase & Weigand, supra note 121, at 344.
169. LANGBEIN, supra note 161, at 79.
170. Id (noting that while continental and lay judges sit together, lay judges are not in-
structed regarding the necessary quantum of evidence and are only advised, if necessary, dur-
ing in camera deliberations).
171. See id at 80 (stating that the jury instructions extend American trials considerably).
"Juries have the disadvantage... of being treated like children while the testimony is going
on, but then being doused with a kettleful of law during the charge that would make a third-
year law student blanch." Id (quoting JUDGE CuRns BoK, I Too, NICODEmus 261-62 (1946).
Professor Langbein explains that in Germany neither defense nor prosecution counsel are pres-
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G. ITALY
In 1989, after an extended period of study and debate, the Italian government
implemented a "radically altered" code of criminal procedure.172 The new system
is more accusatorial in nature than the previous inquisitorial system:17 the prose-
cutors and defense attorneys are now in an adversarial relationship 74 and the
judges assume a more neutral role similar to their American counterparts. 175
The Italian criminal justice system, like the German system, does not use a jury,
but in the intermediate-level court, the Court d'assise, the professional judge is
assisted by lay judges.1 6 Like the German courts, 1n all Italian courts must pro-
vide "reasoned" verdicts to explain the rationale used to reach the decision, and the
accused can appeal both the factual premises and the legal analysis.' n
The Italian Constitution guarantees that the government will not consider an ac-
cused guilty until there is a "definitive conviction."179 In his excellent overview of
ent during the explanation and are therefore unable to object. Id at 79. He then notes that
there are several safeguards which may make the practice defensible:
(1) German judges are lifetime professionals of generally high minimum
competence, rather than the political appointees who populate the trial
bench in some American cities; (2) in the more serious cases the trial court
contains two other professional judges who are present when the third
gives informal instructions in camera; (3) the court must %wite a reasoned
judgment explaining its results, including its view of the law, and (4) there
is liberal right of appeal from the first-instance judgment.
Id at 79-80. Regarding Professor Langbein's first point, one must note that prejudices and
biases afflict those of "high minimum competence" and "political appointees" alike. fad
172. Freccero, supra note 120, at 348.
173. See id at 349 (stating that the new Italian code of criminal procedure incorporated an
accusatorial aspect into the former system).
174. See id (explaining that the new code transformed the Italian criminal proceedings into
adversarial contests between the accuser and the accused).
175. See ida t 348-49 (describing the new Italian system and explaining that the new sys-
tem transformed the role ofjudge from performing investigations to supervising and presiding
over cases). But see Marco Fabri, Theory Versus Practice of Italian Criminal Justice Reform,
77 JuDicATuRu 211-12 (1994) (asserting the existence of difficulties in changing entrenched
habits and practices in the Italian legal community).
176. Freccero, supra note 120, at 350-51 (explaining Italy's three-tiered criminal court
system). At the lowest level is the Pretura in which one professional judge rules in all cases
with a penalty of less than four years confinement. fa at 350. The intermediate-level is the
Court d'assise where a panel of eight judges, two professional and six lay judges, hear serious
cases such as murder and espionage. Id at 351-52. The Tribunale is composed of three career
judges and hears all cases not heard by the other two courts. I at 352.
177. See Frase & Weigand, supra note 121, at 344 (discussing the German law requirement
for an exhaustive written judgment describing how the court reached its decision).
178. Freccero, supra note 120, at 351-52 (stating that Italy's Constitution requires the
courts to explain their decisions).
179. See ida t 359 (stating the Constitution requires a condanna definitive (definitive con-
viction)). The conviction is definitive when all opportunities for legal review are exhausted or
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the Italian criminal justice system, Stephen Freccero notes that "[w]hile this prin-
ciple effectively serves the same function as the U.S. 'presumption of innocence,'
it is not entirely analogous."' 80 The Italian declaration is literally a presumption
that the accused is not guilty, as opposed to an affirmative statement of inno-
cence." ' 81 He argues, therefore, that the Italian standard is less protective than the
Anglo-American presumption of innocence until proven guilty beyond a reason-
able doubt.1
8 2
H. SWEDEN
Sweden revised its legal code in 1941 183 and, unlike Italy,184 incorporated ideas
and systems from other countries only to the extent that they were compatible with
the Swedish legal culture. 85 Even so, the criminal system still has its critics.
186
Sweden has an adversarial criminal system that presumes the accused is inno-
cent until proven guilty. 8 7 Like several other European nations, Sweden also uses
lay judges, known as ndmnd.18 8 The namnd assist the professional judges in all
aspects of the decision and share in the determination of factual issues and ques-
tions of law; the judge, however, has the controlling vote. s9 The court is expected
to use its own common sense and sound judgment in determining the relative im-
portance of evidence.190
Rather than the "guilt beyond a reasonable doubt" standard used in the United
States, the proof system in Sweden consists of three principal parts. 191 First, the
the parties have not utilized further appeals processes. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id
182. Id at351-52.
183. THE SWEDISH CODE OF JUDICIAL PROCEDURE 6 (Anders Bruzelius & Krister Thelin
eds., rev. ed. 1979).
184. See Fabri, supra note 125, at 216 (noting that despite 1988 tensions, the Italian crimi-
nal justice system remains inefficient). Fabri argues that this continued inefficiency is due in
part to the cultural difficulty in accepting the new adversarial system. Id
185. See THE SWEDISH CODE OF JUDICIAL PROCEDURE, supra note 183, at 6-7 (noting that
those who developed the Swedish legal system not only incorporated the Austrian Code, but
also studied the literature of the United States, England, France, and Germany).
186. See AN INTRODUCTION TO SWEDISH LAW 138 (Stig Strdmholm ed., 2d ed. 1988)
(noting that criminal proceedings have been criticized frequently and that there have been pro-
posals for reform).
187. MAJOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS, supra note 160, at 156.
188. THE SWEDISH CODE OF JUDICIAL PROCEDURE, supra note 183, at 7-8.
189. See id. (noting that the ndmnd's opinion will not overrule the judge's contrary opinion
unless all three namnd on a panel of three, or at least seven n'mnd on a full panel of seven to
nine, concur upon the final order and the reasons underlying it).
190. See id. at 6 (noting the new code abolished limits on the review of evidence), The
court was to use its own common sense and judgment to decide the level of importance of
various items of proof. Id.
191. See id at 10 (stating there are three aspects to the Swedish proof system).
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system treats the concepts of relevance and admissibility similarly. 92 Second, the
court may evaluate anything that occurs during the course of the trial: witness de-
meanor, content of the testimony, exhibits, obedience of court rules by the parties,
and claims of privilege with respect to testimony.193 Third, the court must outline
the logic of how it reached the verdict in the final judgment. 1%
I. JAPAN
Legal scholars generally recognize Japan's criminal justice system as being
both very efficient and generally lenient.195 Commentators note, however, a likeli-
hood of judges presuming guilt due to the conviction rate of over 99.8% s. A
Japanese judge is pressed not to issue acquittals.19 7 Thus, in Japan, although there
is a professed adherence to the concept of "innocent until proven guilty" under the
law, in practice, many assume the guilt of the accused.'" Consequently, under the
modem Japanese system, there is considerable intrusion on personal autonomy,
t5
and, therefore, the system provides no transferable lessons for the concept of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.
192. Id
193. Id at 10-11.
194. Id at 11. Thus, in Sweden, the court is not required to find guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, but instead, is required to use common sense and all available evidence to reach a con-
clusion which is then explained in the final judgment.
195. See Daniel H. Foote, The Benevolent Paternalism of Japanese Criminal Justice, 80
CALIF. L. REv. 317, 318 (1992) (noting the disparity between solved crimes, convictions and
prison time). In Japan the clearance rate of crimes - the percentage of crimes that are solved -
is among the highest in the world, and its conviction rate is over 99.8% yet fewer than 5% of
the adult suspects considered by police to have committed Penal Code offenses are sentenced
to prison. Id But see Setsuo Miyazawa, Looking at the Criminal System Through Numbers,
427 HOGAKU SE~miA 32, 37 (1990) (contesting Japan's clearance rate because the police do
not list all reported crimes).
196. Foote, supra note 195, at 371 n.297. "[l]t is probably inevitable that judges enter
criminal trials with at least a subconscious assumption of guilt" Id
197. Id (quoting Aldra Kitani, The Duties of Judges, in Hogaku Seminar Extra Number,
Special Comprehensive Series No. 27, Present Day Trials 243, 247-248 (1934)) (noting that
"[this unguarded statement has rather sobering implications for the presumption of inno-
cence').
[When acquitting a defendant,] there must not be any mistakes in one's
memory of testimony or reading of depositions, and if there is any loose-
ness in logic, the prosecutors will unquestionably attack it. To issue an
acquittal... the opinion must be one that will withstand critical review by
the higher court.
Id
198. Id at344.
199. Id at332.
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
Despite the lack of success in finding the "beyond a reasonable doubt 'Rosetta
Stone,"' the concept of reasonable doubt requires an explanation and an attempt at
definition. The use of archaic terms such as "moral certainty" creates a meaning-
less definition for the ordinary United States citizen. Furthermore, Justice Gins-
burg's analogy of "firmly convinced" 2°° is not the panacea either. On a
"convinced scale" of one to ten, if "beyond a reasonable doubt" receives a rating
of about a nine, and "a preponderance of the evidence" about a six, "firmly con-
vinced" would receive about an eight, and it should be a nine. For example, one
may be "firmly convinced" that there is life on other planets, but cannot be con-
vinced of that "beyond a reasonable doubt."
The British Columbian Court of Appeals proposed model instructions centered
around the concept that "if you ask yourself why do I doubt?-you can assign a
logical reason by way of an answer,",201 probably provides the most satisfactory
explanation. This explanation tells jurors that more than a "hunch" or a "gut-
feeling" that someone other than the accused might have committed the crime is
necessary; they need to be able to articulate to themselves the reason behind their
doubt that the defendant committed the crime.
202Drawing largely from the Canadian Model Jury instruction, the following
jury instruction provides some relief from uncertainty:
A reasonable doubt is exactly what it says-a doubt based on
reason--on the logical processes of the mind. It is not a fanciful
or speculative doubt, nor is it a doubt based upon sympathy or
prejudice. It is the sort of doubt which, if you asked yourself,
"Why do I doubt?"--you can assign a logical reason by way of
an answer. A logical reason in this context means a reason con-
nected either to the evidence which has been presented during
this trial, or to an absence of evidence which you believe is es-
sential to conviction. If you have a nagging question in the back
of your mind about the guilt of the defendant, you must examine
and resolve that question to your own satisfaction one way or the
other. In the end you must be convinced of the guilt of the de-
fendant beyond a reasonable doubt. °3
As to the standard of proof, the court could instruct the jury as follows:
200. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text (explaining Justice Ginsburg's concur-
rence in Victor v. Nebraska, 114 S. Ct. 1239, 1252 (1994)).
201. See Regina v. Brydon, [1995] 95 C.C.C. (3d) 509, 511 (providing a model reasonable
doubt instruction).
202. Id
203. Cf id at 509 (noting widespread disagreement in common law jurisdictions through-
out the world on actual definition of "reasonable doubt") (Wood, J.A., dissenting).
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You must not base your doubt on the proposition that noth-
ing is certain or impossible or that anything is possible. You are
not entitled to set up a standard of absolute certainty and to say
that the evidence does not measure up to that standard. In many
things it is impossible to prove absolute certainty.
If, after a careful consideration of all the evidence in this case,
there remains in your mind a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of
the accused, the State has failed to meet the standard of proof
which the law requires, the presumption of innocence prevails
and you must-not may-acquit. On the other hand, if a careful
consideration of all the evidence leaves you with no reasonable
doubt as to the guilt of the accused, the presumption of inno-
cence has been overcome and it is your duty to convict t 4
Most thoughtful jurors should find that explanation fairly straightforward and
comprehensible. It incorporates the dual concepts that the jurors should be nearly,
but not absolutely, certain of guilt and that they should be able to explain to them-
selves, but not necessarily to others, the reasons for their doubt. Yet the instruction
does not try to explain every possible nuance and legal ramification of the term
and thus does not become complex and confusing.
It is important to note, however, that in whatever terms one uses, any instruc-
tion should be comprehensible to the target, the average juror, rather than to the
jurists and lawyers writing and issuing the instructions.
V. CONCLUSION
No judicial system in any country in the world adequately defines the concept
of "innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Virtually no defini-
tion of this concept escapes criticism. The Webster charge,,05 hailed by some in its
day as a near-perfect definition, had contemporary and subsequent critics. Neither
the English, the Canadians, nor the Australians developed a definition that evades
criticism throughout their own criminal justice systems. Those systems that use
the inquisitorial method do not use the concept of "beyond reasonable doubt," but
leave the determination of guilt or innocence largely to the instincts, experience,
and common sense of the professional judge. Thus, the professional judge is rela-
tively free to bring his own personal biases and prejudices to bear on the problem.
The suitability of any explanation of the term "reasonable doubf' is in the eye
of the beholder, no explanation will be entirely satisfactory to all. The proposed
explanation, however, serves to provide at least a basic framework for the average
jurors and precludes them from having to invent their own definition.
204. Cf id (explaining disagreement in common law jurisdictions regarding the definition
of"reasonable doubt standard of proof' creates uncertainty forjudges giving jury instructions).
205. Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass 295 (1850). "[Reasonable doubt] is not mere
possible doubt because everything relating to human affairs, and depending on moral evi-
dence, is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. . ." Id at 320.
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